


LiteLMGuard: Seamless and Lightweight On-Device Guardrails for Small Language Models against Quantization Vulnerabilities

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
Research Goal

- Designing and developing a practical offline on-device deployable safety mechanism for securing Small Language Models (SLMs) against any quantization induced risks and vulnerabilities.




Motivation

- Quantization significantly impacts trustworthiness and ethical aspects of SLMs [1].
- Vulnerable on-device quantized SLMs provide accurate responses to direct unsafe activities.




Threat Model: Open Knowledge Attack




(a) Adversary corrupting an open-source SLM

(b) Any Casual User gradually becoming an Adversary, by gathering sensitive information regarding unsafe activities

LiteLMGuard



Prompt Filtering Effectiveness of LiteLMGuard (Cont.)




Performance of Answerability Classification Models

Model	Accuracy	Precision	F1 Score	ROC-AUC	Recall/TPR	Specificity/TNR	FPR	FNR
LSTM	93.44	90.00	93.82	98.78	97.98	88.75	11.25	2.02
BiLSTM	94.26	93.65	94.40	98.20	95.16	93.33	6.67	4.84
CNN-LSTM	94.47	93.68	94.61	97.33	95.56	93.33	6.67	4.44
CNN-BiLSTM	93.85	90.98	94.16	98.75	97.58	90.00	10.00	2.42
AvgWordVec	94.67	95.12	94.73	94.68	94.35	95.00	5.00	5.65
MobileBERT	95.08	94.44	95.20	95.07	95.97	94.17	5.83	4.03
ELECTRA	97.75	97.21	97.80	97.74	98.39	97.08	2.92	1.61

Safety Effectiveness of LiteLMGuard

Unsafe Response Rate

Relative Safety Effectiveness



Conclusion

- We designed and developed a practical and usable on-device guardrails for securing SLMs.
- Our LiteLMGuard is seamless, can be integrated with any on-device SLM.
- Our LiteLMGuard enabled real-time offline prompt filtering with over 85% defense-rate against harmful prompts (including jailbreaks), 94% filtering accuracy and ~135 ms average latency.

References

[1] Nakka, Kalyan, Jimmy Dani, and Nitesh Saxena. "Is On-Device AI Broken And Exploitable? Assessing the Trust And Ethics in Small Language Models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.05364 (2024).

Contact

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Latency

Device	Direct Instruction		DeepInception		AutoDAN	
	AdvBench	Behaviors	AdvBench	Behaviors	AdvBench	Behaviors
OnePlus 12	135.00	135.77	132.29	131.85	133.62	143.41
Pixel 8	155.32	152.59	146.48	156.64	140.01	154.22
Samsung S21	136.38	104.99	126.97	104.54	134.18	105.59