BitBypass: A New Direction in Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models with Bitstream Camouflage

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Focus

- Developing a jailbreaking attack that circumvent LLM's safety alignment, for enabling the development of robust safety measures and secure LLMs.

Research Questions

1. How to effectively circumvent LLM's safety alignment?
2. Is it very difficult to jailbreak LLMs?

Background

- **Safety Alignment of LLMs.**
  - LLMs inherently do not generate safe content.
  - Strong safety alignment is enabled in LLMs through supervised fine-tuning, RLHF or red-teaming.
- **Jailbreaking of LLMs.**
  - An adversarial attack for circumventing LLM's safety alignment and tricking it into generating unsafe content.

Intuition



Threat Model: Open Access Jailbreak Attack



BitBypass

Overview



Example



Evaluation Setup

Evaluators.

[E1] Refusal-Judge[1]
[E2] LLM-Judge[4]
[E3] Harm-Judge[5]

Attacker's Perspective.

Attacker needs a jailbreaking attack that has low RRR and high ASR, BPR and PCR

Metrics.

Response Refusal Rate (RRR)[E1]

$$RRR = \frac{n_s}{N} \times 100$$

Bypass Rate (BPR)

$$BPR = \frac{m_{bp}}{M} \times 100$$

Harmfulness Score (HS)[E2]
Quality Score (QS)[E2]

$$r_{us} \Leftarrow HS(r) \geq 3 \ \wedge QS(r) \geq 3$$

Phishing Content Rate (PCR)[E3]

$$PCR = \frac{n_h}{N} \times 100$$

Attack Success Rate (ASR)

$$n_{us} = \#r_{us}$$

$$ASR = \frac{n_{us}}{N} \times 100$$

Results: Bypassing Guard Models

Target Guard Models.

- OpenAI Moderation
- Llama Guard
- Llama Guard 2
- Llama Guard 3
- ShieldGemma

Datasets.

[D1] AdvBench[1]
[D2] Behaviors[2]

Metrics.

1. BPR



Results: Generating Phishing Content

Target LLMs.

- GPT-4o
- Gemini 1.5 Pro
- Claude 3.5 Sonnet
- Llama 3.1 70B
- Mixtral 8x22B

Datasets.

[D3] PhishyContent[3]

Metrics.

1. PCR



Results: Adversarial Performance

Target LLMs.

- GPT-4o
- Gemini 1.5 Pro
- Claude 3.5 Sonnet
- Llama 3.1 70B
- Mixtral 8x22B

Datasets.

[D1] AdvBench[1]
[D2] Behaviors[2]

Metrics.

1. RRR
2. ASR

RRR



ASR



Average



Conclusion

- We developed a novel black-box jailbreaking attack, called BitBypass, that jailbreaks LLMs through bitstream camouflage.
- Empirical results illustrates that BitBypass is highly effective in terms of adversarial performance, bypassing guard models and generating phishing content
- Additionally, BitBypass demonstrates the ease of jailbreaking safety-aligned LLMs with just one word camouflage.

References

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